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Controlling Patent Prosecution History 
THOMAS G. FIELD, JR.* 
One of the most salient effects of patent prosecution history 
arises in the context of the doctrine of equivalents.  Under that doc-
trine, although patent claims may be found to be broader than their 
literal scope, territory surrendered during prosecution cannot be en-
compassed as equivalent.1  Nor can territory forfeited by initial fail-
ure to claim be captured under the doctrine of equivalents.2  Most 
attorneys who prosecute applications are apt to be aware of such 
problems and to take measures to avoid them. 
But prosecution history (or the lack thereof) may cause more dif-
ficulty when prior art presented by alleged infringers was not earlier 
considered.  One scenario is presented in Graham v. John Deere Co. 
of Kansas City.3  That opinion is the first to set out the parameters of 
the nonobviousness requirement first codified in 1952,4 but it is 
equally noteworthy for its treatment of prior art not considered dur-
ing prosecution. 
  
 * Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center.  The author appreciates the 
comments of Thomas G. Field III, Associate General Counsel – Intellectual Prop-
erty, Saint-Gobain Corporation, concerning an earlier draft, but the views ex-
pressed here should not be attributed to him. 
 1.  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
737, 740–41 (2002) (rejecting a rule that any change in claim language would 
forfeit territory but putting the burden on patentees to demonstrate otherwise). 
 2. See, e.g., Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A 
patentee may not narrowly claim his invention and then, in the course of an in-
fringement suit, argue that the doctrine of equivalents should permit a finding of 
infringement because the specification discloses the equivalents.  Such a result 
would merely encourage a patent applicant to present a broad disclosure in the 
specification of the application and file narrow claims . . . .”). 
 3. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).  This opinion addresses the validity of two unrelated pat-
ents, each of which had been asserted against unrelated parties.  Id. at 4–5.  Al-
though the Fifth Circuit had found Graham’s patent valid, in the opinion reviewed 
here, the Eighth Circuit found it invalid.  Id. at 4.  In two other consolidated cases, 
however, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the validity of a patent held by Cook Chemi-
cal Co.  Id. at 5.  This celebrated trilogy finds both patents invalid.  Id. at 4–5. 
 4. Id. at 17 (construing 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006)). 
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The new art at issue was “[a] spring clamp devised, manufac-
tured and sold by Glencoe Manufacturing.”5  Comparing that device 
with Graham’s invention led the Court to say that “all of the ele-
ments in the [Graham] patent are present in the Glencoe structure.”6  
Moreover, the Court stated that “the mechanical operation is identi-
cal [and] . . . [t]he mere shifting of the wear point . . . presents no 
operative mechanical distinctions, much less nonobvious differ-
ences.”7 
With regard to the shifting of the wear point, the Court refused to 
consider an alleged advantage which Graham “heavily relied on in 
the courts” because it was not considered during prosecution.8  Ef-
forts to have the Court consider the advantage were said to be remi-
niscent of an earlier case9 “where the Court called such an effort ‘an 
afterthought.  No such function . . . is hinted at in the specifications 
of the patent.  If this were so vital an element in the functioning of 
the apparatus, it is strange that all mention of it was omitted.’”10 
Had Graham documented any purported advantage of his inven-
tion over Glencoe’s device in his specification,11 possibly further 
supporting it with affidavits,12 he would surely have fared better.  At 
a minimum, he would not have been precluded from arguing the 
point in court.13 
  
 5. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 216 F. Supp. 272, 273 (W.D. Mo. 
1963), rev’d, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964), aff’d, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 6. Graham, 383 U.S. at 26. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 23. 
 9. Lincoln Eng’g Co. of Ill. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 550 (1938). 
 10. Graham, 383 U.S. at 25 (alteration in original) (quoting Lincoln Eng’g, 303 
U.S. at 550). 
 11. See id. (stating that the alleged advantage was not “a significant feature in the 
patent”). 
 12. See, e.g., In re Carleton, 599 F.2d 1021, 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (holding that 
the applicant’s “affidavits, when considered with all of the evidence, are sufficient 
as a matter of law to rebut the prima facie case of obviousness.”); see also U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 716 (8th ed., rev. 7 2008) [hereinafter MPEP] (affida-
vits or declarations traversing rejections). 
 13. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 25. 
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To distinguish the Glencoe device, however, Graham needed to 
be aware of it.14  There is no indication that he was.15  As an appli-
cant perhaps unsure of the value of his invention at the time of filing, 
he would have had less incentive to conduct an exhaustive prior-art 
search than did John Deere once his patent threatened exclusion 
from a seemingly lucrative market. 
In a relatively neglected companion case, United States v. Ad-
ams,16 however, the patentee successfully overcame challenges 
based on new art.17  First, the nearly unanimous Court18 agreed that 
Adams’s invention was nonobvious because “at the time Adams per-
fected his [battery,] noted experts expressed disbelief.”19  It was nev-
ertheless eventually adopted for use during World War II.20 
Second, although the exact basis for expert skepticism was un-
clear, unexpected advantages were also helpful in overcoming newly 
cited prior art.21  Perhaps the major advantage of Adams’s battery is 
that water, alone, could serve as an electrolyte.22  In stark contrast 
with what is said in Graham,23 the Court found: 
[Adams’s] present reliance upon this feature was not the af-
terthought of an astute patent trial lawyer.  In his first contact 
with the Government less than a month after the patent appli-
  
 14. See id. at 26. 
 15. Id. 
 16. 383 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 17. Id. at 40. 
 18. Only Justice White dissented, without opinion.  Id. at 52.  Justice Fortas did 
not participate.  Id. 
 19. Id.  Such evidence also overcame suggestions that the invention was actually 
taught in the prior art.  Id.  Unexpected results had been seen before to serve the 
same ends.  E.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 60 
(1923) (“[W]hen we consider the indisputable fact that Eibel’s successful experi-
ment . . . surprised the whole paper trade, and that for a short time many held back 
from risking so radical a change and then all adopted it, oral evidence that some 
persons had discovered the source of trouble and the means of remedying it some 
years before Eibel is incredible.”). 
 20. Adams, 383 U.S. at 44. 
 21. See id. at 48–49. 
 22. Id. at 48. 
 23. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 25 (1966) (quoting Lin-
coln Eng’g Co. of Ill. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 550 (1938)); see 
supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
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cation was filed, Adams pointed out that “no acids, alkalines 
or any other liquid other than plain water is used in this cell.  
Water does not have to be distilled.”24 
In Teleflex Inc. v. KSR International Co.,25 the district court 
stated that “if Asano had been cited to the Examiner, he would have 
found the combination of Asano and Smith to be obvious, just as he 
found [another combination] to be obvious.”26 
The Federal Circuit, however, objected to that approach: 
[W]here the factual bases of an examiner’s decision to allow 
a claim have been undermined—as in other cases where prior 
art not before the examiner is brought to light during litiga-
tion—a court’s responsibility is not to speculate what a par-
ticular examiner would or would not have done . . . , but ra-
ther to assess independently the validity of the claim . . . .  
Such determination must take into account the statutory pre-
sumption of patent validity.27 
Apparently agreeing more with the district court than the appel-
late court, the Supreme Court found: 
We need not reach the question whether the failure to dis-
close Asano during the prosecution of Engelgau voids the 
presumption of validity given to issued patents, for claim 4 is 
obvious despite the presumption.  We nevertheless think it 
appropriate to note that the rationale underlying the presump-
tion—that the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the 
claim—seems much diminished here.28 
In that respect, observations in the Brief for the United States are 
also relevant: 
  
 24. Adams, 383 U.S. at 49.  That water need neither be pure nor added prior to 
use was surely an advantage on the battlefield.  See id. 
 25. 298 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Mich. 2003), vacated, 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 26. Id. at 595. 
 27. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 289 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (first 
alteration in original) (quoting Torpharm Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 336 F.3d 
1322, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2003)), rev’d, 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 28. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007). 
File: Field Prosecution Final.doc Created on: 2/26/10 11:49 AM Last Printed: 2/26/10 11:49 AM 
2010 CONTROLLING PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY 235 
[T]he prior art—specifically the Asano patent, which respon-
dents had not provided to the PTO—revealed the placement 
of a mechanical throttle control on an adjustable gas pedal 
assembly’s support bracket. . . . The district court correctly 
concluded a person having ordinary skill—in this case, a me-
chanical engineer familiar with pedal assembly design and 
presumed to know the prior art—would have recognized the 
advantage of incorporating an electronic sensor into Asano’s 
adjustable gas pedal assembly and placing the electronic sen-
sor at the very same location as the mechanical linkage.29 
Whether Teleflex was aware of the Asano patent prior to filing 
the Engelgau application is unknown.30  Unlike much prior art ad-
dressed for the first time in litigation,31 it was a U.S. patent32 as read-
ily available as anything considered during prosecution.  Despite 
that, however, there would have been no reason for Teleflex to dis-
tinguish the prior art in the specification absent apparent relevance in 
the context of the claimed invention.33 
The Asano patent was also, of course, readily available to the ex-
aminer.  Were that patent seen as relevant, it should have been 
found, cited, and applied34 in the first office action.35  It seems pecu-
liar that neither the government’s brief nor any of three court opin-
ions reference the examiner’s fundamental duties, much less con-
sider whether they may have, in fact, been fulfilled.36 
  
 29. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28–29, 
KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350) [hereinafter Brief for the United 
States]. 
 30. It is not clear whether Teleflex prosecuted the Engelgau patent, but, in line 
with the suggestion in the government’s amicus brief, that is assumed here.  See id. 
 31. E.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 26 (1966) (refer-
encing the Glencoe device); see supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 32. U.S. Patent No. 5,010,782 (filed July 28, 1989). 
 33. See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (“[I]t is fundamental that 
claims are to be construed in the light of the specifications and both are to be read 
with a view to ascertaining the invention.”). 
 34. See MPEP, supra note 12, § 2141.01(a). 
 35. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 132(a), 133 (2006) (indicating that an applicant has six 
months to respond to a notice of rejection). 
 36. See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 12, § 2141.01(a) (explaining an examiner’s du-
ties regarding analogous and nonanalogous art). 
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It seems ironic that the Supreme Court finds failure to disclose 
Asano as diminishing the presumption of validity while crediting the 
examiner’s expertise.37  This is so because a diminished presumption 
would seem appropriate only if, instead of positing expertise, the 
Court were to posit incompetence.  It is likewise ironic that the gov-
ernment claims that “a person having ordinary skill . . . would have 
recognized the advantage of incorporating an electronic sensor into 
Asano’s . . . pedal assembly and placing the electronic sensor at the 
very same location . . . .”38 
Indeed, if the Court posits examiner competence, the most rea-
sonable inference seems to be that such a person presumably “having 
ordinary skill”39 in the art was aware of Asano and found it irrele-
vant—perhaps for reasons advanced by Teleflex to rebut the finding 
that the Asano patent rendered the claim in question obvious.40  Ab-
sent documentation to that effect in the prosecution history, how-
ever, the Court was free to conclude that “[n]othing in the declara-
tions proffered by Teleflex prevented the District Court from reach-
ing the careful conclusions underlying its order for summary judg-
ment in this case.”41 
It may be difficult for others to avoid being in that or a worse sit-
uation.  Failure to be aware of all prior art at the time of filing, to 
anticipate arguments that might be advanced, and to rebut them in 
the specification and during prosecution diminishes the capacity to 
overcome arguments challenging validity based on obviousness and 
may entirely foreclose attempts to rebut as in Graham.42 
Surely, the most difficult task will be to identify and distinguish 
prior art that may be seen as relevant by persons who lack “ordinary 
  
 37. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007). 
 38. Brief for the United States, supra note 29, at 29.  Moreover, although the 
Solicitor General was counsel of record, General Counsel for the Department of 
Commerce and the Deputy General Counsel and PTO Solicitor are credited as 
authors.  Id. at I. 
 39. Id. at 29. 
 40. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 423–24 (“In light of Teleflex's failure to raise the 
argument in a clear fashion, and the silence of the Court of Appeals on the issue, 
we take the District Court's conclusion on the point to be correct.”). 
 41. Id. at 427. 
 42. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1966). 
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skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”43  Should that 
be possible, however, it will be hard for courts to find an invention 
obvious in light of such art and presumably impossible to resolve the 
issue by summary judgment. 
Some firms apparently are reluctant to search lest they later be 
found to willfully infringe patents that might be discovered.44  How 
much that potential has been diminished by In re Seagate Technol-
ogy, LLC45 remains to be seen, but that case signals reduced inclina-
tion to uphold findings of willful infringement.  Others may regard 
searching as unnecessary or too expensive. 
Regardless of their reasons, those who fail to conduct thorough 
and thoughtful searches should weigh carefully the risk of invalidity 
for failure to distinguish arguably relevant prior art during prosecu-
tion. 
  
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 44. Email from Ann M. McCrackin, Director of the Patent Practice and Proce-
dure Program, Franklin Pierce Law Center, to author (Jan. 27, 2010, 2:24 EST) 
(on file with Pierce Law Review). 
 45. 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
